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Probability Theories and the Justification of Theism 
Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal, Brasília 
In the present paper I intend to analyse, criticise and 
suggest an alternative to Richard Swinburne’s use of 
Bayes’s theorem to justify the belief that there is a God. 
Swinburne’s contribution here lies in the scope of his pro-
ject and the interpretation he adopts for Bayes’s formula, a 
very important theorem of the probability calculus, which 
reads as follows: 
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h is the hypothesis under assessment, e is the set of 
evidence in view of which the hypothesis is assessed and 
k is background knowledge. 
Swinburne uses the framework provided by the theorem 
to reconstruct the main arguments of natural theology in 
an inductive case in favour of theism aimed to academic 
and scientific circles, which are the most sceptical as 
regards religious belief. 
1. Logical Bayesianism applied to Theism 
For Swinburne, the Bayesian formula is the formal 
expression of scientific inductive reasoning in the assess-
ment of how much probable a hypothesis is in view of 
relevant evidence. In his application of Bayes’s theorem to 
justify theistic belief, Swinburne aims to show that theism 
is confirmed by some relevant pieces of evidence. In other 
words, he wants to show that the existence of God is more 
probable than not (i.e. has a probability higher than 0.5) in 
view of evidence such as the existence of the universe, 
order in this universe, the providential character of this 
order, and the occurrence of conscious beings in this 
providential universe. In view of all these pieces of 
evidence, Swinburne holds that: 1) their expectedness or 
probability of happening anyway (P(en/k)) is very low, and 
2) that they are all well explained in view of the hypothesis 
of theism, that is, P(en/k)<P(en/h.k). In fact, the decisive 
piece of evidence in Swinburne’s cumulative case is reli-
gious experience, which becomes the argument that tips 
the balance in favour of theism (see Swinburne 1991, 
291). 
However, the adaptation of the natural theology argu-
ments to Bayes’s formula is not the only part of Swinbur-
ne’s probabilistic approach to the justification of theism. In 
addition to the likelihood calculation, that is, the proportion 
between how much evidence e gets explained by hypo-
thesis h and the expectedness of e (P(e/h.k)/P(e/k)), the 
Bayesian interpretation of inductive reasoning postulates a 
consideration of the prior probability of h. 
The assignment of prior probabilities is the most contro-
versial part of Bayesianism as an interpretation of scientific 
reasoning. In this respect, there are two main positions in 
the Bayesian field. There are those who postulate that the 
estimate of priors is a matter of universal and neutral 
criteria that stem from logical considerations only. In 
addition, there are those who hold that prior probabilities 
are a matter of subjective opinion, i.e. just a personal initial 
degree of belief in a certain hypothesis. For the subjectiv-
ists, the only constraints on the assignment of prior 
probability values would be coherence, that is, the con-
formity to the axioms of probability calculus (see De Finetti 
1989). 
For Swinburne the subjective theory of Bayesian prob-
ability is not able to provide an adequate account of con-
firmation of theories by evidence in scientific contexts (see 
Swinburne 1973 24). For him, we should select a theory 
prior to the consideration of evidence, which amounts to 
estimating its prior as higher than its rivals’, using three 
objective parameters: fitness with background knowledge, 
scope and simplicity, which is the most significant of them. 
For Swinburne, the principle that, all being equal, 
simplicity indicates that a hypothesis is true is a synthetic a 
priori truth, that is, it is a condition for theoretical scientific 
activity being a rational enterprise (Swinburne 1997, 56). 
In other words, our normal conception of science is that 
this is an activity guided by rational criteria for selecting 
hypotheses, not by random procedures without any 
ordering principles. Thus, where the rival theories we are 
discussing refer to a field of research with no neighbouring 
area and where they cannot be distinguished in terms of 
scope, we need to resort to the principle of simplicity, 
otherwise our theory selection will be irrational. 
Unfortunately there are strong reasons for believing that 
Swinburne’s attempt to use simplicity as a directly 
applicable, objective and impersonal criterion for ascribing 
a prior probability to theism fails. For the sake of brevity, I 
will only outline them here: 
The concept of simplicity has too many different mean-
ings (see Prevost 1990, 50); 
The application of this concept in theory choice is not 
direct, but requires judgement based on the shared 
knowledge of the research community (see Sober 1988, 
69 and Salmon 1998, 563); 
There is no clear interpretation of the principle of sim-
plicity in Bayes’s theorem if we follow Swinburne’s 
account; 
The reduction of simplicity to quantitative and mathe-
matical terms resorts to a concept of infinite that conflicts 
with the theological meaning of it (see Le Blanc 1993, 
62); 
It is at least highly controversial that theism is a simple 
hypothesis (see Fawkes & Smithe 1996); 
The idea that we need simplicity to adjudicate among an 
infinite number of hypothesis is either contrary to the 
probability calculus or too artificial to account for scientific 
confirmation. 
In addition, it is highly polemical to say that a hypothesis 
is always a priori more probable than another because of 
its simplicity. Indeed, a too simple a theory is frequently 
considered implausible even before we take into account 
the phenomena it aims to explain. Instead of a linear 
gradation for evaluating a hypothesis in view of simplicity 
so that the simplest it is the most probable in principle, it 
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seems more correct to take simplicity as medium optimum 
above which we have complex theories and below which 
we have simplistic ones. In this case, neither the complex 
nor the simplistic should be a priori more probable than the 
simple one. If so, however, the application of the criterion 
for estimating prior probabilities is far from straightforward. 
Instead, it requires familiarity with the prevailing conception 
about what is the optimum of simplicity in the research 
area we are referring to in order to sustain a trained judge-
ment. So, we can even agree with Swinburne that sim-
plicity is not a sheer methodological or pragmatic criterion, 
but that it has something to do with theory truth-value. 
However, the definition of what simplicity amounts to and 
the application of this parameter for assessing the plausi-
bility of a hypothesis depend on the background knowl-
edge shared by a given community of researchers. 
2. Intersubjective Probability and the 
Justification of Theism 
The theory of probability that is behind Swinburne’s ap-
proach takes probability as a logical relationship between 
propositions, which is regulated by a priori correct 
inductive criteria valid in all contexts. The problem with this 
view is that it cannot live up to its intention, that is, the 
application and definition of these criteria end up being 
dependent on judgement. However, Swinburne and the 
proponents of the logical theory are right in not accepting 
the subjective theory of probability as an account of scien-
tific inference, since theory choice in this context is not a 
matter of pure personal taste. 
The view I intend to defend is based on an intermediate 
between the logical and the subjective theories of proba-
bility. An account of this view is the intersubjective theory 
of probability proposed by Donald Gillies. According to 
him, intersubjective probability is an extension of the 
notion of subjective probability, that is, it is defined by the 
degree of belief shared by a group of individuals in a 
proposition p. This degree of belief is defined by how much 
money the group is prepared to bet in p in a psychological 
experiment. The basic requirement is that the group be 
coherent in the probability assignments it proposes, i.e. 
that it complies with the axioms of probability calculus, 
otherwise, following from the Dutch book argument, it will 
lose money for sure. In addition, each individual of the 
group has to follow the group view in the initial degree of 
belief attributed to the proposition in question (see Gillies 
1991, 517). 
Gillies claims there are two requirements for this theory 
to work. The first one is the existence of a common pur-
pose that unifies the group so that it needs to have a 
coherent, shared view of the probability of the hypothesis 
in question. The second one is that the individuals can be 
informed about the degrees of belief shared by the group 
and correct their prior probabilities accordingly. As a result, 
the intersubjective theory of probability can account for the 
fact that the probabilities ascribed to hypotheses in 
scientific contexts are neither a matter of individual taste 
nor stem from a single rational degree of belief on which all 
rational human beings should agree. Instead, the high 
degree of consensus in the scientific community should be 
interpreted as intersubjective probabilities, that is, common 
beliefs shared by a group with the common purpose of 
putting forward true theories about matters of fact and 
relations of concepts. It is on the basis of their shared 
background knowledge that scientists agree as to whether 
a given hypothesis is confirmed by a certain piece of 
evidence. 
The application of this theory of probability to the epis-
temology of theism can be outlined as follows. First, we 
need to define the research community we are referring to, 
i.e. an account of who is involved in the discussion about 
the rational justification of the belief in God. It seems 
reasonable to circumscribe it to people interested in recon-
ciling religious belief and the tenants of philosophic and 
scientific argumentative reason. In other words, Swinburne 
is right in addressing the academic and scientific circles 
with his religious epistemology, because it is in this type of 
group that the question about the justification of religious 
belief arises. Particularly, the question is posed to those 
who have belonged to a religious community since their 
early years but who also became part of a scientific, 
academic or any intellectually sophisticated group later on. 
For those religious believers who do not participate in the 
environment defined by argumentative reason the problem 
of the rationality of theism is much less pressing if it exists 
at all. 
If the question of justification of theism is a problem 
particularly posed to those who both have a religious 
upbringing and participate in the environment dominated 
by argumentative reason, then their common purpose can 
be to evaluate the extent to which the belief that there is a 
God meets the requirements of intellectual respectability 
given both their religious faith based on a certain experi-
ence of God and the constraints posed by reason. In 
Bayesian terms, this will mean that the prior probability 
they will ascribe to the hypothesis of theism will be higher 
than the one attributed by someone who does not have a 
religious background. Yet they also have to consider in this 
prior probability judgement some elements that count 
against this initial plausibility such as the fact that religious 
experience is fundamentally ambiguous and can be des-
cribed in different ways, and that there is disagreement 
about the matter, for example (see McKim 2001 252). 
This way of considering the particular religious back-
ground of the theist who engages in the discussion of 
God’s existence has the advantage of being more realistic 
than the one supposed by Swinburne. There is no neutral 
starting point in this matter, as there is no neutral starting 
point in scientific reasoning. From a Bayesian perspective 
there is no problem in starting to participate in a debate 
from a determinate point of view as long as we are 
coherent in our degrees of belief, and are set to update our 
initial probabilities in light of evidence. An interesting 
phenomenon Bayes’s theorem enables us to see is that to 
the extent that evidence is considered, the importance of 
our determinations of prior probability gradually decreases. 
In the limit, given certain conditions, the consideration of 
evidence will lead to a convergence of opinion where one 
of the alternatives will reach probability one, as the others 
tend to zero. 
The crucial element in this discussion will be the extent 
to which the opponent parts in this debate share a 
common background knowledge that is sufficient to make 
a difference to opinion convergence. The fact that both 
contending groups share the same heuristic values and 
reasoning standards prescribed by intellectually sophisti-
cated circles is a reason to believe that this is possible in 
principle. 
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In sum, my suggestion for using Bayesianism in the 
discussion of the justification of theistic belief focuses on 
the idea that Bayes’s theorem expresses two very distinct 
moments in inductive reasoning. First, the prior probability 
of theism is better thought of in terms of a particular 
degree of belief shared by a group and based on their 
specific background knowledge. Second, the likelihood 
calculations, where the particularity of the priors tends to 
vanish given that here we will consider public evidence 
and evaluate their confirmatory force for the hypothesis 
according to criteria prescribed by background knowledge 
common to the contending groups. 
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